VHC 7: Hospitality, Punishment, and the Atonement
Don't penal theories reduce atonement to strict contracts of exchange? This is the main question that Boersma seeks to address in ch. 7. Alternatively, he focuses on penal representation as the moment of divine hospitality. This involves two critiques: First, a critique of those who consider the penal substitution model as inherently tied to the Church-state relationship of the fourth century; second, his own critique of penal substitution in some tendencies of Western atonement theology ("juridicizing, individualizing, and de-historicizing" (154)). He argues that hospitality requires violence; therefore the cross' hospitality requires violence; and that beyond rational argument, the eschatological reality of God's pure hospitality shows this, as well. (For clarity, Boersma believes Anselm's work is best described as satisfaction, but also includes under its umbrella sacrifice, vicarious suffering, punishment, and propitiation (158)).
First, Boersma takes on the challenge that Anselm begins the talk of substitution, which was absent from the early church, only emerging in Constantinian Christendom. This model made salvation a legal transaction rather than transformation; an individual matter rather than social and systemic; and left it de-historicized rather than tied to the biblical narrative (155). While Boersma upholds these critiques himself in some versions of substitution in Western theology, he notes the historical errors found therein. First, why does it take 700 years for this atonement theology to get worked out in Anselm if Constantinian Christendom is what gives birth to it? Second, the councils of the time (Nicea and Chalcedon, to which some tie the notion of substitution) had Arian opponents--who were more friendly to the government than Athanasius, etc. whose work retained orthodox teaching.
Second, Boersma notes elements of substitution in the early church. He offers quotes from Gregory of Nazianzus (325-389), showing that while substitution does not stand on its own in early thought, it is present. He also notes an underlying theology in Irenaeus which assumes propitiation, although it does not mention it explicitly (e.g., the place that Christ takes in the New Covenant against the false notion that OT sacrifices can propitiate God).
Boersma is careful to holds two tensions throughout the discussion: Punishment in atonement theology has but need not lead to unnecessary violence; punishment cannot be the only understanding of atonement.
His own critical work of penal substitution begins with the radical wing of Augustinian theology which he sees as covenant/federal theology. This emphasized God's eternal decrees rather than historical covenant, leaving atonement a strict juridical act, meaning Christ's act could have taken place at any point in human history. Influenced by the New Perspective on Paul, however, Boersma reclaims what he sees as the historical and accurate covenantal notions of atonement. Recall Boersma's earlier talk of recapitulation which includes punishment. He then concludes, "The cross is not simply an arbitrary divine punishment inflicted on God's Son, a punishment that could have taken place at any time and in any place, but is a historically dated expression of God's hospitality, accompanied by the type of violence (punishment) without which such hospitality cannot materialize" (171).
Boersma then offers exegesis of Paul (esp. Galatians) to show the nature of God's election of Abraham. Israel was meant to be governed by hospitality and punished (as a last resort in exile) only in order to be redeemed and to encourage repentance. The cross mirrors this hospitality of punishment in order to reconcile and recapitulates the exile of Israel. Those who now bear the marks of faith (as opposed to the marks of the works of the law) are part of the community God promised to raise up through Abraham. The resurrection requires the new community of God to display his hospitality, but not pure hospitality. Pure hospitality would crush the very identity of those who bear the marks of faith. Our welcome of the stranger, then, will include some form of violence.
(Interestingly, Boersma sees penal substitution as possibly leading to violence against the believer. The extent to which Christ suffered violence as punishment may open the doors of the believer too widely who may let in another violent actor. God's violence, then, is not a "bloodthirsty" violence against his Son, but the violence of divine suffering (178, n. 81). From this position, Boersma keeps looking at more atonement models.)
First, Boersma takes on the challenge that Anselm begins the talk of substitution, which was absent from the early church, only emerging in Constantinian Christendom. This model made salvation a legal transaction rather than transformation; an individual matter rather than social and systemic; and left it de-historicized rather than tied to the biblical narrative (155). While Boersma upholds these critiques himself in some versions of substitution in Western theology, he notes the historical errors found therein. First, why does it take 700 years for this atonement theology to get worked out in Anselm if Constantinian Christendom is what gives birth to it? Second, the councils of the time (Nicea and Chalcedon, to which some tie the notion of substitution) had Arian opponents--who were more friendly to the government than Athanasius, etc. whose work retained orthodox teaching.
Second, Boersma notes elements of substitution in the early church. He offers quotes from Gregory of Nazianzus (325-389), showing that while substitution does not stand on its own in early thought, it is present. He also notes an underlying theology in Irenaeus which assumes propitiation, although it does not mention it explicitly (e.g., the place that Christ takes in the New Covenant against the false notion that OT sacrifices can propitiate God).
Boersma is careful to holds two tensions throughout the discussion: Punishment in atonement theology has but need not lead to unnecessary violence; punishment cannot be the only understanding of atonement.
His own critical work of penal substitution begins with the radical wing of Augustinian theology which he sees as covenant/federal theology. This emphasized God's eternal decrees rather than historical covenant, leaving atonement a strict juridical act, meaning Christ's act could have taken place at any point in human history. Influenced by the New Perspective on Paul, however, Boersma reclaims what he sees as the historical and accurate covenantal notions of atonement. Recall Boersma's earlier talk of recapitulation which includes punishment. He then concludes, "The cross is not simply an arbitrary divine punishment inflicted on God's Son, a punishment that could have taken place at any time and in any place, but is a historically dated expression of God's hospitality, accompanied by the type of violence (punishment) without which such hospitality cannot materialize" (171).
Boersma then offers exegesis of Paul (esp. Galatians) to show the nature of God's election of Abraham. Israel was meant to be governed by hospitality and punished (as a last resort in exile) only in order to be redeemed and to encourage repentance. The cross mirrors this hospitality of punishment in order to reconcile and recapitulates the exile of Israel. Those who now bear the marks of faith (as opposed to the marks of the works of the law) are part of the community God promised to raise up through Abraham. The resurrection requires the new community of God to display his hospitality, but not pure hospitality. Pure hospitality would crush the very identity of those who bear the marks of faith. Our welcome of the stranger, then, will include some form of violence.
(Interestingly, Boersma sees penal substitution as possibly leading to violence against the believer. The extent to which Christ suffered violence as punishment may open the doors of the believer too widely who may let in another violent actor. God's violence, then, is not a "bloodthirsty" violence against his Son, but the violence of divine suffering (178, n. 81). From this position, Boersma keeps looking at more atonement models.)
posted by Aaron Perry at
10:53 AM
3 Comments:
Have you read Leithart on OD? It may be germane.
leithart on o'd where? i've read about o'donovan in Against Christianity and on leithart's website. did you have anything in mind in particular?
i think i just found what you had in mind. let me see if i can defend o'donovan's view of punishment: that it bears no benefit for the victim. a judgment is both forward and backward looking. it looks backward because that is where the offense takes place and judgment is always a response. it is forward looking in that it hopes to create a new public context where such wrongs do not happen; it hopes to make the context where reconciliation is possible.
punishment is enacted judgment. punishment is distinguishable from judgment but not other than judgment.
obviously judgment can be done on behalf of the victim, but o'donovan maintains that punishment cannot. it seems to me that this is a proper notion: it simultaneously makes judgment followed through in punishment necessary for the public (to create the new public context), and allows the victim to engage in forgiveness themselves against their perpetrator.
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