Some Thoughts on "Whose Afraid of Postmodernism?"

James K.A. Smith has written a great little text on postmodernism put to Christian use. "Whose Afraid of Postmodernism" (Baker, 2006) avoids, for the most part, all the abstract rhetoric that I think dominates some emergent conversations. In the book, Smith looks at three faces of postmodernism and the "bumper sticker slogans" associated with each one.

He first looks at Derrida and the claim that "there is nothing outside the text." I find this an impossible claim to ignore with the genesis of so many news stations--some even "fair and balanced"!--and even a compelling claim to believe. Smith defends Derrida's slogan, saying he is not a liguistic idealist--that all the world is language--but that there is nothing outside interpretation. The world is even something that is interpreted--it is a text. Hence, the slogan could be considered as saying something like "There is nothing that is not a text." Smith then examines how this denudes the modernistic idea of neutral reason that can adjudicate between truth claims, instead grounding interpretations in certain communities. Because nothing is outside interpretation, everything can be deconstructed and reconstructed. (Derrida says that the only thing that cannot be deconstructed is deconstruction.) From my own research, deconstruction is a very helpful category for what happens in some tellings of personal narratives in the presence of a critical, but gracious listener.

Second, Smith examines Lyotard's idea that postmodernity is incredulity toward metanarratives. This was the claim I wanted to hear defended the most. Smith says that modern epistemology, dominated by science, appeals to neutral, mythologically free, data. This overarching narrative justifies the modern notions of truth, objectivity, etc. Smith says that Lyotard's beef is not with the bigness of narratives, but with the nature of the claims they make. The problem is legitimation of worldviews based on overarching truth claims that should be accessible to any who think hard (or clearly) enough. Smith says, instead, that all claims (even scientific ones) are grounded in narratives which are culturally and temporally conditioned. Because all claims are such does not negate whether or not one is true; only the certainty with which truth is known. So, because of this, Christianity can boldly proclaim its historical, cultural, temporal, etc. story without appealing to something beyond it. It can preach in humility and confidence.

Third, Smith examines Foucault and his claim that "power is knowledge." What Foucault means by this is that communities, which have power necessarily, form truth claims based on the strucutures already found therein. Power has a role in determining what the truth is. Knowledge is not neutral. Now, one can read Foucault as a Nietzschean--meaning power is neither good nor bad, but just there, or as a Liberal--meaning power is bad and please take your hands of my individual autonomy. Smith reads Foucault as the latter, and proceeds to defend power, but with a dose of skepticism to the structures even the church can idolize and through which become abusive.

The final chapter was (unfortunately) the most abstract and will take too long to unpack it here and now.